This page presents a gallery of example diagrams, uploaded as web pages. SafetyBarrierManager can directly generate and upload such web pages. The example safety-barrier diagrams show different features of SafetyBarrierManager and ways of modeling accident scenarios.
- ExampleProject presents the combined risk assessment for a run-away reaction and overfilling of a storage tank. It demonstrates the use of Risk Reducing Measures.
- Two examples show how SafetyBarrierManager supports the Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA). Safety-barrier diagrams can replace a LOPA sheet with the added benefit of visualisation. The examples show the continuing examples used in the CCPS book: Layer of Protection Analysis – Simplified Process Risk Assessment. Two examples are given, one example uses “Method 1” with categories of consequences, and the other “Method 3” with a semi-quantitative assessment of fatality risk. The last example shows how risk from different accident scenarios can be aggregated in the safety-barrier diagram project to get total risk of an operation. The project and diagrams are annotated to explain the correspondence (or difference) with the LOPA sheets in the CCPS book:
- Validation Examples demonstrate how SafetyBarrierManager deals with the logic and quantification of fault trees, showing the difference between “conditions” and “events”
- PassingVesselCollisionEventTree presents an event tree for the collision of a passing ship with some offshore installation. It shows the use of event-tree elements. Event-tree elements are also used to model conditional probabilities (such as the fatality rate for some hazardous consequence). The example also demonstrates how the same basic model can be used to model different types of consequences simultaneously, in this case fatality risk and risk of damage to assets. All consequences are shown in the risk matrix. The summation of results leads to a value for individual fatality risk
- HydrogenFuellingOptions show how results from and FMEA study are transferred to barrier diagrams. This is a qualitative analysis. Note the remark for the barrier “hydrogen sensors”, being not a complete barirer (detection only), and the difficulty to define the consequence on failure of this “barrier”, being an “unnoted explosive atmosphere”.